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Abstract 
The Bologna Process is often portrayed as a unique instance of the effective operation 
of the techniques of the new modes of governance in a pan-European forum.  Yet, 
despite its apparent ‘success’ as a policy model, comparatively little attention has 
thus far been paid to the process in the Political Science and European Studies 
literatures.  The present paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of this 
neglected governance dimension of the Bologna Process.  The main sections of the 
paper provide a survey of the underlying political logics of the process; examine the 
nature and limits of the main policy instruments deployed; and assess the overall 
scope and limits of participation in the policy arena created.  This allows for a final 
balance sheet to be drawn, suggesting the need for a reconceptualisation of the new 
modes of governance so as better to account for the strategic positioning of actors 
within and across different policy arenas. 
 
Introduction 
The Bologna Process has been widely regarded as a successful instance of 
pan-European cooperation making use of ‘soft law’ policy instruments of a type more 
widely associated with the European Union’s Open Method of Coordination or the so-
called ‘new modes of governance’.  The process has established strongly articulated 
templates for the comparability of university degree structures and attendant policy 
areas (notably quality assurance), which have been widely diffused across its (now) 
47 member states and further afield.  Yet, though apparently resting on a wide 
European-level policy consensus, the Bologna Process has increasingly generated 
substantial political oppositions.  Recent European-level meetings have been greeted 
with important student demonstrations, while at the national level significant ‘anti-
Bologna’ movements have taken root in a number of European countries. 
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Against this background, the process has generated a vast literature within the 
higher education policy community – largely (though not exclusively) concerned with 
what are cast as issues of implementation and the implications of attendant structural 
changes for national higher education (HE) systems.  Despite its obvious political and 
policy interest, however, Political Science and European Studies scholars have thus 
far paid comparatively little attention to the process.  Indeed, only in recent years 
have significant studies appeared which examine the Bologna Process in its 
governance dimension.  Haskell (2009) has, in this vein, produced one of the first 
systematic analyses of the Bologna Process in relation to models of ‘innovative 
governance’. Ravinet’s doctoral work (2007) and related publications (2008; 2011) 
have sought to explain the emergence of a higher education policy arena surrounding 
the Bologna Process, with a particular interest in the development of policy 
instruments.  Relatedly, Corbett (2005) has produced a seminal analysis of the 
historical development of the EU’s role in higher education policy, as well as the 
relationship of this EU arena to the Bologna Process (Corbett 2011).  Capano and 
Piattoni (2011) have similarly tackled the influence of the Lisbon Agenda and its 
governance architecture on HE reform in Europe, paralleling Piattoni’s (2010: 131-
173) work on HE reform as an instance of multi-level governance. 
The present paper seeks to advance this governance agenda, drawing more of 
an overall balance sheet of the ‘lessons’ of Bologna for our wider understanding of 
the new modes of governance than has heretofore appeared in the literature. 
Specifically, it presents results from a now concluded two-year research project 
examining the political dynamics of the Bologna Process and wider issues of 
  4
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university reform in Europe, 1  in a form intended to serve as the basis for a 
contribution to a collaborative project concerned with ‘Assessing New Modes of 
Governance’.2  To that end, the paper adopts a comparatively light touch approach as 
regards the wider theoretical frameworks associated with the new modes of 
governance, essentially incorporating salient elements where appropriate in a 
presentation which privileges the analysis of the Bologna Process itself. An overview 
of the broad dynamics of the Bologna Process is first presented, before attention is 
turned in the following two sections to more specific examinations of key governance 
issues. The first of these sections focuses on questions related to policy instruments, 
assessing the (in)effectiveness of the techniques of peer review and monitoring 
adopted.  The next section then looks at the wider question of whether the process 
may be seen to have ‘democratised’ policy debate in the area – pointing to the 
opening of participatory possibilities, but even more to the marked presence of what 
are termed strategies of ‘discursive closure’.   The conclusion brings these elements 
together, both presenting a balance sheet and suggesting the need to shift the focus of 
our analyses so as better to account for the differential impacts of the new modes of 
governance on the creation and (re-)shaping of policy arenas in a complex system of 
multilevel governance.  
 
Defining the Process: Logics of Reform and Recognition 
The impetus for the Bologna Process may be understood in terms of 
overarching logics of ‘reform’ and ‘recognition’.  It is clear that the initial motivation 
ignificantly rooted in attempts to create a European 
 
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the University of Luxembourg for the ‘Euro-Uni’ 
internal research project (2010-2012), undertaken together with Dr. Gangolf Braband. 
2 Coordinated by Prof. Paolo Graziano and Prof. Charlotte Halpern.  A special issue of Comparative 
European Politics is currently in preparation. 
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leverage for the realisation of otherwise difficult, if not blocked domestic reforms in 
the higher education sector.  Many participants, through to the present, continue to see 
– and use – Bologna in these terms as an external catalyst for (unpopular) internal 
change.  Yet, as the circle of Bologna participants expanded, so too, inevitably, did 
their core motivations for joining the group.  Particularly (though not exclusively) in 
the case of many late joiners, Bologna was less about reform than about recognition.  
Here, it is seen as placing (often peripheral) national HE systems ‘in the club’, so as 
to derive such benefits as membership may provide in the European context and to 
enjoy a shared external ‘brand’ likely to appear as more prestigious or creditable than 
a strictly national referent.  This diversity of designs further accounts for the 
structures of the process.  From the outset, the Bologna Process was a loose 
intergovernmental vehicle centred on a set of broadly defined, principally 
instrumental objectives.  Although now transformed into the European Higher 
Education Area (EHEA), it continues to be defined by these characteristics through to 
the present.   This section of the paper provides a brief chronological outline of how 
the Process took shape, focusing first on the founding Sorbonne and Bologna 
declarations before turning to a brief account of the later (consistent) patterns of 
development. 
The origins of the Bologna Process are conventionally dated from the 25 May 
1998 Sorbonne Declaration, in which the ministers responsible for higher education in 
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom committed themselves ‘to 
encouraging a common frame of reference, aimed at improving external recognition 
and facilitating student mobility as well as employability’.3  For at least three of the 
four participating ministers, it is clear that the utility of the European declaration was 
 
3 Available at: http://www.ehea.info/article-details.aspx?ArticleId=80  
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principally seen as that of an additional means to foster difficult domestic reforms.4 
The host of the gathering, French Education Minister Claude Allègre, was himself an 
internationally established natural scientist (geochemist), who had come to the 
portfolio with a strong commitment to redress what he saw as the declining national 
position in the international research community.  This reform impulse had, 
moreover, been given more tangible form in the January 1998 report of the Attali 
commission on the reform of French higher education,5 which had notably proposed 
the adoption of an ‘L-M-D’ degree structure.6 Much the same reform impetus also 
existed in the German and Italian cases, where the ministers concerned, Jürgen 
Rüttgers and Luigi Berlinguer, were similarly seeking to overcome domestic reform 
impediments, notably as posed by the complex workings of the federal system in the 
former case and institutional corporatisms in the latter.  Only British participation 
finds no ready explanation in a reform agenda at home; Tessa Blackstone’s 
acceptance to attend the Paris meeting perhaps found its rationale in a desire to 
burnish ‘European’ credentials in the early years of the New Labour governments.7 
The initial reception accorded to the Sorbonne declaration was far from 
globally positive.  In particular, many of the smaller EU member states resented their 
exclusion, seeing the meeting as a rather high-handed attempt by the four big member 
states to impose their own agenda, bypassing the courtesies and constraints of 
 
4 See, for example, Corbett 2005: 194-196 and Haskell 2009: 273.  Also confirmed in Interview (2) 
12.05.2011.  
5  Rapport pour un modèle européen d’enseignement supérieur : rapport à M. le Ministre de 
l’éducation nationale, de la recherche et de la technologie, January 1998.  Available at : 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/984000840/index.shtml  
6 ‘Licence – Master – Doctorat’, following the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of Bachelor’s, Master’s, and 
Doctoral degrees.  The pre-Bologna French system had a more complicated hierarchy of qualifications, 
including the ‘DEUG’ (Diplôme d’Etudes universitaires générales) awarded after two years of study, 
the Maîtrise awarded after three years, and the DEA (Diplôme d’études avancées) awarded after five 
years. 
7 In Blackstone’s own words: ‘[I]t did not make a huge amount of difference to what we do in the UK 
but I saw it as a positive development from the point of view of having a more common framework 
across Europe’.  Interview 15.12.2011. 
  7
               
communautaire processes.  That the Sorbonne declaration should lead to that which 
became the Bologna Process was thus by no means an automatic development – but 
rather required skillful policy entrepreneurship, while also benefiting from a 
‘coordination imperative’. 
As widely acknowledged in the literature, it was the independent educational 
expert Guy Haug who played the most prominent role as a policy entrepreneur in 
building the bridge from the Sorbonne to Bologna (Corbett 2005: 197-199: Ravinet 
2011: 32n).  Haug was commissioned by the Conference of European Rectors to 
produce a report surveying the then current state of European HE.  The report, the 
first in that which has become a regular series of Trends reports, essentially sought to 
reframe the debate by underlining the ‘extreme complexity’ of degree structures 
across the continent, and the manifold impediments which existed to educational and 
labour mobility. 8 Even more importantly, however, a brief annex was attached to the 
report directly addressing the Sorbonne Declaration – spelling out ‘what it does say, 
what it doesn’t’.  This annex sought to appease those countries that had felt 
themselves excluded, stressing that the Sorbonne meeting was intended only as the 
first step in a gradual and open process.  It also underlined the generality of the 
commitments envisaged, pointedly distancing the European process from the Attali 
‘L-M-D’ proposal.  The Declaration, it was stressed, did not prescribe a particular 
degree structure model or a narrow ‘harmonisation’, but committed states only to 
move towards a system of internationally recognised and comparable degrees. 
Reframed in this manner, the process began to assume a forward momentum, 
further accelerated by that which Haskell (2009: 276-277) has termed a ‘coordination 
imperative’. In effect, as it became progressively more likely that some form of 
                                          
8 Available at: http://www.eua.be/eua/jsp/en/upload/OFFDOC_BP_trend_I.1068715136182.pdf 
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cooperation would take hold at the European level, the ‘rational’ response for smaller 
or more peripheral players became one of ‘if so, we had better be in’ (Ibid: 277).   On 
the one hand, the reframing of the Sorbonne Declaration had been such as to stress the 
limited constraints on – and thus likely costs for – states of being ‘in’.  On the other 
hand, the risks of being ‘out’ appeared to be growing; non-participating states would 
potentially forfeit such educational and labour mobility gains as might be on offer, as 
well as the stronger international recognition factor which might be offered by 
identification with the wider arena.  The basic calculus of participation had thus 
changed, with earlier reticence regarding the project (or at least irritation concerning 
the initial manner of proceeding) giving way to a generalised momentum favouring 
greater coordination. 
It is thus in this context that one must situate the 19 June 1999 Bologna 
declaration, committing its 29 signatories to a broad agenda intended ‘to consolidate 
the European area of higher education’. 9  The core of the declaration concerned 
interlocking issues of comparability and mobility – promoting a transition towards 
easily readable and convergent (though not harmonised) degree structures backed by 
apposite quality assurance mechanisms, so as to permit a greater facility of movement 
both as a cornerstone of European integration and as a key factor of growth in modern 
economies.   In doing so, however, the process created no legally binding 
requirements, and was careful to avoid prescribing overly specific models or 
parameters.  In keeping with the logics previously discussed, Bologna thus set out 
paths to reform, but left wide spaces of discretion to participating states as to how – or 
even whether – to pursue those paths. 
 
9 Available at: http://www.ehea.info/article-details.aspx?ArticleId=80  
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In the ensuing decade, running from Bologna to the formal launch of the 
European Higher Education Area with the Budapest/Vienna meeting of March 2010 
and beyond, these basic logics have not been fundamentally altered.  While no 
overarching declaration of principles has ever been adopted as regards the process, its 
core objectives have remained essentially consistent over time (cf. Zgaga 2012) – 
supplemented by the later additions of action lines concerned with the development of 
doctoral training and the social dimension of higher education.  The ‘soft law’ 
character of the process has also remained unchanged, with a marked resistance on 
the part of the participating states towards any potential ‘hardening’ of the character 
of commitments.  A possible strengthening of commitments along these lines was, 
notably, discussed in the run-up to the 2005 Bergen meeting.10  At this time, the 
secretariat prepared a working document which explicitly posed the question as to 
whether, going forward, EHEA principles should continue to be regarded as simple 
‘guidelines’ or assume the form of binding commitments. In this latter case, the 
document further sketched out a possible ‘legal instrument’ along the lines of the 
Lisbon Recognition Convention and also, in the event of a severe and persisting 
breach, opened the door to a possible suspension or expulsion of the offending party 
(‘the Bologna partners may be free to reconsider the relations to such country’).  The 
proposal quickly became – and has remained – a dead letter. 
The development of the process has also been characterised by the deliberate 
maintenance of a very light degree of institutionalisation.  Most notably, neither the 
Bologna Process nor the post-2010 EHEA has had a permanent secretariat; this 
function continues to be performed, on a rotating basis, by the incoming of chair of 
the next (bi-/tri-annual) general meeting.  Moreover, proposals over the years to 
 
10 The present discussion is based on that of Zgaga 2012: 24. 
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create such a secretariat or to vest it in an existing European institution would all 
appear to have met a prompt demise.  One of the first moves in this direction appears 
to have been a Franco-German proposal to confer the function on the European 
Commission in the early 2000s – a proposal rejected by the Commission itself before 
having had the chance to be put before the wider group of participating states (where 
other oppositions would likely have manifest themselves). 11  More recently, a 
similarly negative fate befell a proposal initiated by the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly calling for the establishment of ‘a more stable 
secretariat…at the Council of Europe’ in conjunction with the formal constitution of 
the EHEA in 2010.12  The initiative was greeted by something of a double rejection 
by the Bologna Follow-Up Group (BFUG).  The BFUG reiterated its general position 
that ‘there was no need to change the existing organisational structure’ and, for good 
measure, went on to put the nail in the coffin by stressing that, even were this to be 
contemplated, ‘it would not need automatically to be placed in the Council of 
Europe’.13  
Perhaps the most significant change to date has been that of the geographical 
enlargement of the community of participating states.  The original group of 29, 
composed essentially of EU/EEA states and then EU candidate countries, has become 
a pan-European grouping of 47 participants.   This too must, however, be seen in 
terms of the basic continuity of the characteristics of the process.  In essence, it is the 
‘looseness’ of the commitments that permitted rapid enlargement, while this 
expansive enlargement then in turn further reinforces the ‘looseness’.  Most evidently, 
ncerns both the nature of the systems represented and 
 
11 Interview (1) 12.05.2011. 
12  Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 1892 (2009), para. 16.3 
(emphasis mine).  
13 Meeting of the Bologna Follow-Up Group, Madrid, 18-19 February 2012. BFUG (BE/AL) 21_3, para. 
13. 
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their objectives in participating – has dramatically increased.  Markedly different 
levels of engagement may be detected as regards both the inputs and the outputs of 
the process.  Concerning the inputs, the differential levels of participation of member 
states – at and in meetings – emerged as a consistent theme amongst interviewees in 
the present research project.  It is apparent that only a (somewhat variable) minority 
of member states actively invests in policy discussions, with a correspondingly large 
number of bystanders.  Similarly, at the level of outputs, Furlong (2010) has identified 
clusters of member states in terms of their differential implementation of Bologna 
commitments, broadly relating (with some outliers) to patterns of temporal, spatial, 
and functional factors.  In explicating this differentiation he, moreover, points to the 
character of Bologna as a ‘deliberately intergovernmental association’ operating on 
something of a ‘pick and choose’ basis, whose inclusiveness proves possible ‘not 
because the costs of exclusion are high, but because the costs of membership are 
relatively low’ (Furlong 2010: 305-306). 
 
Instrumentalising the Process: The Development and Limits of Stocktaking 
Peer review in the Bologna Process to date has taken the form of regular 
‘stocktaking’ exercises, feeding into the production of an implementation report 
surveying national progress produced prior to each biannual (after 2012 triannual) 
general follow-up meeting.   The headline results of these reports appear as a set of 
‘traffic light’ indicators – in which national performance as regards the main Bologna 
action lines is scored relative to a series of categories running from dark red (serious 
deficiencies) through amber (some outstanding issues) to dark green (full 
implementation).  
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These exercises have become more institutionally formalised and 
methodologically refined over time.  Whereas only some participating countries chose 
to produce reports prior to the 2001 Prague meeting, this had become a generalised 
practice by the time of the 2003 Berlin gathering.  From the 2005 Bergen meeting 
onwards this has, moreover, made use of a standardised reporting form.  Since 
Bergen, there has also been a progressive refinement of the indicators used, as well as 
a growing involvement of professional statistical agencies as a ‘check’ on national 
self-reporting.  Data gathered by Eurostat, by the EU coordinated educational 
reporting network EURYDICE and the EUROSTUDENT project concerned 
particularly with the social dimension thus now all feed into the assessments of 
national performance. 
Ravinet (2008), in her analysis of the policy instruments of the Bologna 
Process, makes the case for the relative effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms 
put in place – arguing that these ‘soft’ instruments have progressively assumed a more 
‘constraining’ character as regards the participating states. A system of ‘voluntary 
participation’ has consequently been transformed into one of ‘monitored cooperation’, 
in which ‘countries feel increasingly bound by their commitments’. The argument 
rests on two foundations.  First, she argues that the multiplication of sources of 
information surrounding the process (including stakeholder reports) creates an 
effective check on the accuracy (or indeed the veracity) of national reports – ‘It is 
increasingly unwise for countries to produce wishful or false reports’ (Ibid: 362).  
Second, she holds that ‘shaming’ mechanisms then work within the context of the 
coordination process itself, pushing countries towards effective implementation so as 
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to avoid the ‘political sanction’ or the ‘embarrassment’ of being shown up as ‘the bad 
pupil in the class’.14 
In contrast, our interviews with European and national officials did not point 
to such a positive or uniform picture.  Rather, something of a strong positional logic 
emerged, with markedly different points of view expressed by European actors and 
their nationally based counterparts.  On the one hand, the European-level officials 
interviewed, both in the European institutions and stakeholder bodies, uniformly 
expressed very critical opinions of the national self-reporting system.  On the other 
hand, their national counterparts tended to regard the exercise as a rather more serious 
and useful one, but even here expressed this in nuanced or contextualised terms 
departing from Ravinet’s suggestion of a more generalised movement towards a 
culture of compliance. 
As highlighted in the series of quotations below, the ‘traffic light’ system, at 
least as it existed prior to 2012, found little support amongst seasoned European 
observers.  The central line of criticism is clear – the mechanism, relying on national 
self-assessment, produces ‘far too much green’, and as such fosters a false sense of 
accomplishment rather than acting as a spur to processes of policy learning and 
reform.  As various officials put the case: 
When the stocktaking was introduced people wanted to have a green light 
rather than a red or orange light.  Again, that had a positive and a negative 
effect.  It was good at the beginning but at the end everybody doctors their 
answers so that they have green lights.15 
 
The traffic lights are a waste of time because there is an unavoidable move 
towards the green.  Name and shame did not work because it was entirely 
dependent on national reporting and that came in front of the minister before it 
came up.16 
 
14 The quoted phrases are taken from interviews with national officials (Ravinet 2008: 362). 
15 Interview 03.05.2011. 
16 Interview (1) 12.05.2011. 
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The steering of Bologna has not functioned. It is far too green. There should 
be deep red in many more places.  In an intergovernmental process you don’t 
want to blame.  It led ministers to believe that they had achieved what they 
wanted to achieve…You need a system that goes beyond self-reporting….17 
 
Commenting on these shortcomings, another long-serving European official 
sought to diagnose the underlying problem.  As he stresses, the difficulty is one of 
divorcing ‘implementation’ from ‘prestige’; the pressure of the European arena, 
insofar as it exists, may simply produce a type of demonstration effect privileging 
presentational spin (if not misreporting) rather than a genuine concern with change on 
the ground.  This tendency, moreover, may be particularly pronounced for those 
countries with relatively weak track records and whose participation in the process, to 
return to the terms of the previous section, is essentially motivated by ‘recognition’ 
rather than ‘reform’. 
The main challenge is to dissociate implementation from prestige.  Very often 
the more self-critical countries are the countries that have come quite far in 
implementation.  And it may be easier to be self-critical if you know that 
basically you’re OK.  It is much more difficult to be self-critical if you are in 
the lower third. Obviously if you are a minister saying at home that actually I 
haven’t been very successful in implementing European standards it is not 
necessarily a strong card.18 
 
 As previously noted, the national officials interviewed had a rather – 
unsurprisingly – different viewpoint as regards the reporting process.  Our limited 
sample – essentially encompassing only West European officials from countries with 
a relatively active involvement in the process – produced a rather clearly defined 
pattern.  All officials stressed the seriousness with which data is gathered and the 
robustness of reporting procedures.  As one official rather simply but forcefully put 
the case: ‘We make an effort to answer professionally and honestly. We do not 
 
17 Interview (2) 12.05.2011 
18 Interview 22.07.2011. 
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cheat’.19 Beyond this, however, it is clear that the use of the instruments remains very 
much nationally defined. 
In the German case, for example, it is clear that negative returns are seen as an 
instrument for promoting domestic change – particularly, in recent years, as regards 
those remaining parts of the system which have resisted the move towards a reformed 
BA-MA degree structure.  As one interviewee put it, negative results in the Bologna 
Process are ‘awareness raising’, helping from the point of view of reformers to 
overcome the entrenched opposition of ‘some tough and exasperating representatives 
of the faculties’.20  As another official phrased it, poor results are thus not fought, but 
rather used as a further ‘push’ in the context of the domestic reform agenda.21 
Elsewhere, somewhat different dynamics emerged, again in function of 
different national contexts.  Our UK interviewee, for example, noted that negative 
scores in the area of student mobility had served to underline a known problem area 
and spur a degree of action.22   More generally, however, he commented that the 
Bologna Process ‘is not for us really a process of reform’.  Correspondingly, though 
the reporting exercise was taken ‘very seriously’, an unexpectedly poor result would 
demand ‘very clearly lines on why that was the case’ – i.e. an explanation as to the 
working of the procedure or the position of the UK system rather than necessarily an 
instigation of change, in a context (unlike the German) where there is not a direct 
equation of domestic priorities and European commitments (cf. Capano and Piattoni 
2011: 591-595). 
The question of this more general linkage between domestic priorities and 
‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ of policy preferences in 
 
19 Interview 18.11.2011. 
21 Interview 21.11.2011.
20 Interview 18.11.2011. 
 
22 Interview 23.01.2012. 
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the terms of the Europeanisation literature – was further highlighted by a long-serving 
official from one of the smaller West European states.  Acknowledging that ‘You put 
something on the European agenda because it suits your own domestic needs’, he then 
went on to explain how the Bologna Process can in this vein serve as a sort of 
instrument of self-discipline.23  As he put it, ‘The scorecard indicator at the end tells 
you: are you following up on it or not. In that sense it creates the pressure to endorse 
and follow up on the commitment you made in the first place. It is a bit of a chicken 
and an egg question’.  Again, at least relative to a core group of states, one may see 
how the reporting instrument may work positively, but also again in situations where 
the European process may be reflexively related to ongoing domestic processes of 
reform. 
What then to make overall of the Bologna stocktaking procedures? It is clear 
that the methodological rigour of data collection has improved over time, and that the 
process has further benefitted from a significant diversification in the sources of data.  
The reliability of results has thus correspondingly improved over time.  As stressed in 
the executive summary of the implementation report prepared for the 2012 Bucharest 
meeting, the palette of colours in the national scorecards has moved away from (an 
over present) dark green, directly reflecting the progressive refinement of the 
indicators and reporting techniques used.24 
At the same time, however, a cautionary note need still be sounded.  External 
sources of information, such as stakeholder contributions, may present shortcomings 
 
23 Interview 06.06.2012. 
24 The European Higher Education Area in 2012: Bologna Process Implementation Report (Bruss
EACEA, 2012), pp. 7-8.  Available at: 
els: 
http://www.ehea.info/Uploads/(1)/Bologna%20Process%20Implementation%20Report.pdf 
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of their own.25  Even more, the quality of national self-reporting continues to present 
something of a patchwork.  As one moves towards the (geographical) margins of the 
process, egregious instances of politically motivated misreporting may still be found.  
In this respect, the Bologna stocktaking process has not escaped from the deficiencies 
of practice identified by Sabel and Zeitlin (2010: 13) as potentially afflicting forms of 
experimentalist governance.  There are elements here of both ‘ineffectiveness’ and 
‘unworkability’, as ‘in the absence of any sanction or discipline the actors could well 
choose to limit themselves to pro forma participation or worse yet manipulate the 
information they provide so as to show themselves, deceptively, to best advantage’. 
Ultimately, however, the limits of the policy instrument cannot be attributed 
solely to such shortcomings of execution.  Rather, the operation of Bologna appears to 
point to a more fundamental limitation insofar as one might have expected – 
consonant with certain presentations of the new modes of government – a progressive 
dépassement of the initial intergovernmental compact.  In effect, going somewhat 
beyond the Ravinet (2008) analysis cited earlier, the argument here would be that an 
initially loose form of intergovernmental cooperation should, over time, lead to the 
development of dense patterns of socialisation and/or a convergence of policy 
preferences such that the process comes to acquire a progressively more (de facto) 
binding character.  This manifestly has not happened to date, and does not appear to 
be on the cards in at least the short to medium term future.26  The initial logic of 
 
25 See, for example, Geven (2012) for a critical look at the conceptualisation and methodology of the 
Bologna through Student Eyes surveys, seen through the eyes of a former chair of the European 
Students’ Union. 
26 The 2012 Bucharest Communiqué made a move in this direction with the proposed introduction of a 
system of ‘voluntary peer learning and reviewing’, as well as a specific pilot project concerned ‘to 
promote peer learning’ as regards the social dimension.  While (bilateral) peer review of this type may 
significantly enhance evaluative processes and opportunities for policy learning, it could not 
reasonably be expected to reinforce the EHEA at a systemic level unless ultimately generalised on the 
basis of a rigorous protocol. See EHEA Ministerial Conference 2012, ‘Making the Most of Our 
Potential: Consolidating the European Higher Education Area’, Bucharest, 26-27 April 2012, p. 5.  
Available at:  
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Bologna – with a strong component of ‘pick and choose’ – remains very much in 
place, as states continue to pursue differentiated agendas of ‘reform’ and ‘recognition’ 
through the process. 
 
A ‘Democratising’ Effect?: Discursive Space and Discursive Closure 
Beyond an emphasis on soft law and forms of peer review as policy 
instruments, the new modes of governance are also often associated with agendas 
concerned to ‘(re-)democratise’  the policy-making process.  In more robust versions 
of the argument, the new modes of governance are seen to create distinctive 
possibilities for the opening of new channels of participation in the policymaking 
process.  Somewhat more modestly, other accounts emphasise the link between the 
adoption of transparency instruments as part of peer review and an attendant 
enhancement of public accountability.  Across the spectrum, however, a clear linkage 
is made between the adoption of particular techniques of governance and wider 
questions of democratic legitimacy. 
It should be noted at the outset that the Bologna Process has never explicitly 
been conceived in terms of these wider questions of democratic legitimacy.  
Developed outside of the EU and conceived before the formalisation of the OMC, the 
process remains essentially self-standing, unrelated in any direct sense to broader 
agendas of governance reform.  Nevertheless, it is equally clear that, by its structure, 
the Bologna Process raises many of the same questions of democratic accountability 
as arise in the narrower context of the EU’s OMC.   More specifically, as detailed in 
this section, Bologna may be seen to embody much of the ‘democratising’ potential 
associated with the OMC (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010), creating a relatively open 
      
http://www.ehea.info/Uploads/(1)/Bucharest%20Communique%202012(2).pdf  
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‘discursive space’ within which Europe-wide debates about the evolution of the HE 
sector might be conducted.  Yet, despite this potential, the broad pattern of 
development of the EHEA ultimately must be seen as disappointing for advocates of 
the ‘democratisation’ thesis.  In terms consistent with empirical studies of the 
practical application of the OMC (de la Porte and Nanz 2004; Smismans 2008), 
Bologna appears as something of a closed arena – placing a relatively high premium 
on expertise (‘technocratisation’) and tending systemically to reinforce the position of 
a limited range of strategically positioned (principally governmental) actors.  
Moreover, it is also evident that ‘Bologna’ has been deployed as a resource by 
pivotally placed actors in what might be termed strategies of ‘discursive closure’, 
where European norms are (selectively) invoked in a bid to stifle opposition to 
(unpopular) reform agendas. 
Bologna, as noted above, creates a comparatively open discursive space.  The 
long-time Bologna participant and observer Pavel Zgaga has, in this regard, described 
the process rather poetically as having created an ‘agora’ – a forum which ‘has made 
it possible to formulate and confront ideas on higher education in Europe and 
worldwide’ (Zgaga 2012: 31).  Here, it should be underlined that Bologna does not 
promote a particular model of the university or template of higher education 
governance.  Rather, as discussed in the first section of this paper, the core of the 
process is limited to a number of ‘action lines’ defined in essentially instrumental 
terms.  As regards the wider questions of the structuring or purposes of HE systems, 
the process is essentially neutral – or rather defined in broadly inclusive terms.  This 
inclusiveness may readily be demonstrated by a careful textual examination of the 
main communiqués, which point to a careful balancing of such key terms as 
‘competitiveness’, ‘cultural diversity’, ‘institutional autonomy’, and ‘HE as a public 
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good and public responsibility’ (Zgaga 2012: 28).  The idea of ‘competitiveness’, for 
example, has appeared in different guises and with variable intensity across the years 
– reaching a high watermark in London in 2007, but actually disappearing entirely 
from the final document in Bucharest in 2012 (Braband forthcoming).  The terms of 
discussion thus, in themselves, appear very much open. 
The Bologna Process has further seen the progressive extension and 
formalisation of stakeholder participation.  Currently, eight organisations have a 
status as ‘consultative members’ of the process.  This includes the two main 
international organisations operating in the field: the Council of Europe and UNESCO 
(the European Commission is a ‘full member’; see below).  It further encompasses the 
main pan-European representative associations of the key stakeholder groups: the 
European University Association (EUA), EURASHE (representing more vocationally 
oriented higher educations institutions), the European Students’ Union (ESU), and 
ENQA (the European Network for Quality Assurance).  Finally, this was rounded out 
by the later additions of Business Europe and Education International – Pan-European 
Structure (as the ‘trade union’ representative of line academics). 
The consultative members have recognised rights of participation in the 
process, and actively take part both in the main meetings and in the work of the 
follow-up groups.  As such, the EHEA represents an important platform for the 
expression of stakeholder concerns beyond governmental agendas.  This portrait of 
stakeholder qualification is, of course, not without qualification.  Here, as more 
widely in the OMC, questions have been raised as to the representativeness of pan-
European representative associations.  Equally, there are clearly significant 
differences in the capacity of the different stakeholders to engage meaningfully with 
the process.  The contrast between the comparatively influential role played by the 
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EUA as the institutional representative of universities (and thus primarily of their 
central administrations) and the relatively peripheral presence of Education 
International in its ‘trade union’ role is perhaps the most striking instance of such a 
disequilbrium.  Yet, the arena does nonetheless offer possibilities.  Most notably, our 
interviewees (consistent with the wider literature) uniformly highlighted the 
effectiveness of ESU, which has built a strong institutional culture despite the 
inherently transitory character of its membership.  The development of the process as 
regards both the social dimension and an emphasis on ‘student-centred learning’ owe 
much to this consistently well-articulated advocacy. 
Nevertheless, though creating certain participatory possibilities, the overall 
balance sheet of Bologna points to a relatively closed arena – essentially engaging a 
limited community of officials and experts, with little deeper penetration into national 
HE systems.  The Bologna Process corresponds, in this respect, to the transversal 
lessons drawn by Radaelli (2008: 248-251) from the first wave of empirical studies on 
the operation of the OMC, where important evidence of learning ‘at and from the top’ 
did not find, as a counterpart, significant evidence of ‘bottom up’ engagement with 
the processes studied.  Also in keeping with these wider trends, Bologna may be 
significantly characterised, ‘at the top’, by the emergence of a strong discursive 
community – a ‘shared language’ being one of the principal acquis of the process.  
This, in itself, is not a negligible achievement.  As eloquently argued by a national 
official interviewed as part of the present project, Bologna has allowed for dialogues 
to take place across the boundaries of once discrete – and often insular – national HE 
systems: 
One of the nicest experiences we have had in the Bologna Process is that there 
is a conversation at all. That did not exist before and we did not understand 
before what is happening elsewhere…. This has changed due to the 2-3 
meetings per year of the senior civil servants of the higher education 
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ministries. We have a common language: there are two degree cycles, there is 
an output orientation.… We simply developed a common language by talking 
to each other. We are able to place our own system in international categories 
and we can explain to people what we mean. It simply created an atmosphere 
for discussion.27 
 
Yet, at the same time, one must recognise its limits.  The creation of this ‘Bolognese’ 
universe – a term used with a telling frequency by participants and observers alike – 
points to the existence of a thick ‘coordinative’ discourse developed largely in the 
absence of any corresponding ‘communicative’ discourse (Schmidt 2006). 
Comparatively little effort has been invested in seeking to mobilise wider support or 
to foster broader debates around the process. 
This absence of an investment in a communicative discourse may, in part, be 
seen to have been repaid by the growth of significant ‘anti-Bologna’ movements.  
Nationally, strong ‘anti-Bologna’ movements have emerged in a number of European 
countries, most notably in Austria, Germany and Spain.  At the European level, 
‘Bologna’ has, more generally, come to be equated in important academic and student 
circles with a narrowly defined neo-liberal ‘modernisation’ agenda – seen as 
‘ravaging’ the continent’s universities (Charle et Soulié 2007), or as defiling its long-
established university traditions (Schultheis et al. 2008).  Both the 2009 
Leuven/Louvain-la-Neuve and the 2010 Budapest/Vienna meetings were, in this vein, 
greeted with major protests, fuelled in part by the ‘Bologna Burns’ movement.  One 
must, of course, contextualise these protests, which bring together a broad patchwork 
of concerns including both wider political radicalisms and relatively narrow 
institutional corporatisms.  Nevertheless, it remains striking – and symptomatic – that 
the principal politicisations of the process to date have tended to take the form of such 
comparatively radical oppositions or counter-mobilisations. 
 
27 Interview 21.11.2011. 
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DG nonetheless quickly rebou
                                                       
 The growth of ‘anti-Bologna’ sentiments is not, however, solely attributable to 
the absence of a strong European-level communicative discourse in support of the 
process.  Rather, most of these oppositions are more directly explicable with reference 
to the strategic uses which have been made of ‘Bologna’ by pivotally placed actors 
with a view to legitimating wider agendas of HE reform.  ‘Bologna’ has, in effect, 
been used as a resource by actors seeking to curtail or stifle opposition to reform 
agendas in other arenas.  At the European-level, this may be seen in the strategy of the 
European Commission, which has attempted to mobilise support for a parallel HE 
modernisation agenda often inaccurately described as entailing the ‘Lisbonisation of 
Bologna’.  At the national level, ‘Bologna’ has been strategically invoked by national 
governments as entailing wide-ranging ‘obligations’ which they must ‘implement’, in 
terms which seek to cut off domestic debate on the desirability of measures which 
often range well beyond the limited and flexible action lines actually sketched out by 
the process.  The broad logic is thus one, in each case, where ‘European norms’ are 
used in bids to effect forms of discursive closure28 - prompting, unsurprisingly, ‘anti-
European’ protests in return. 
 The role of the European Commission in and in relation to the Bologna 
Process requires explanation.  The Commission was initially sidelined in the process – 
the then French Education Minister, Claude Allègre, in particular being keen to 
ensure that HE cooperation proceeded on an intergovernmental basis outside of the 
EU.29 Although initially somewhat taken aback by this development, the Education 
nded – coming to see a strategic opportunity in these 
 
28 The term ‘discursive closure’ is borrowed from Dostal’s (2004) study of the OECD, though used 
here in a somewhat different vein.  While Dostal applies the term to the strategic development of policy 
positions and attendant communication strategies within an organisation, it is presently applied to the 
establishment of a dominant discourse by actors within the wider policy arena. 
29 Allègre reputedly remarked that he wished to avoid ‘Commission hot air’ (‘les usines à gaz de la 
Commission’).  See Muller and Ravinet 2008: 656.  Allègre himself has more generally extolled the 
virtues of Bologna as an intergovernmental process.  See Allègre 2011: 163-167. 
  24
its historic core – are downpla
                                                       
developments despite its initial marginalisation. 30   In essence, Bologna made 
extensive use of the toolkit developed by the Commission in the Erasmus exchange 
programme,31 while also creating a much broader space for European-level policy 
discussions on HE issues than had previously existed.  As such, the Commission 
could readily position itself to assume both expert and brokerage functions (Haskell 
2009: 274).  Moreover, the emergence of the Lisbon Agenda as a central reference of 
EU policy from 2000 onwards opened further possibilities.  Bologna, in internal 
Commission terms, could thus be tied to the Lisbon Agenda – being seen as a useful 
set of instruments in the development of the knowledge economy.32 
 Following this logic, the Commission, in a series of documents beginning in 
2003, has set out a strongly articulated ‘modernisation’ agenda for Europe’s 
universities.33  The diagnosis in these documents has been a uniformly stark one – 
arguing that the continent’s higher education institutions, despite considerable 
potential, are not playing the role that they should in Europe’s economic 
development.  In order to unleash this potential, it is argued that fundamental 
structural change is needed.  The case is thus made for an increase in both university 
autonomy and university resources, but in terms narrowly tied to the institutions’ 
economic role.  The employability of graduates, together with the (immediate) 
marketability of knowledge in applied forms, is put in the shop window.  
Correspondingly, the civic, cultural and wider educational missions of the university – 
yed.  Indeed, in the most recent Commission paper, the 
 
30 Interview (1) 12.05.2011. 
 
32 Interview (1) 12.05.2011. 
31 Interview (2) 03.02.2011.
33 The main documents in the series are: ‘The Role of the Universities in the Europe of Knowledge’, 
COM(2003) 58 final, 05.02.2003; ‘Mobilising the Brainpower of Europe: Enabling Universities to 
make their Full Contribution to the Lisbon Strategy’, COM(2005) 152 final, 20.04.2005; ‘Delivering 
on the Modernisation Agenda for Universities: Education, Research and Innovation’, COM(2006) 208 
final, 10.05.2006; and ‘Supporting Jobs and Growth: An Agenda for the Modernisation of Europe’s 
Higher Education System’, COM(2011) 567 final, 20.09.2011. 
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tellingly titled ‘Supporting Jobs and Growth: A Modernisation Agenda for Europe’s 
Universities’, these ‘non-economic’ roles disappear entirely from sight, in what may 
reasonably be regarded as a decidedly ‘neo-liberal’ vision of HE.  
   The relationship of this agenda to Bologna needs to be carefully delineated.  
Bologna has not been ‘Lisbonised’ in the sense of being subsumed into the Lisbon 
Agenda.  Similarly, though the Commission has been a full member of the Bologna 
Process since 2001 and has become an important player in the process, it cannot be 
said to ‘steer’ Bologna.  As detailed earlier, the dominant logic of the Bologna 
Process continues to be one of loose intergovernmentalism.  Rather, by what one 
senior official describes as a game of ‘ping pong’ (Corbett 2011), the Commission has 
been able to use the existence of Bologna to develop the EU HE policy arena, 
drawing on a well-known strategic repertoire.  Operating as a ‘purposeful opportunist’ 
(Cram 1993) the Commission has been able to use limited financial and logistical 
resources to facilitate the creation of a broadly sympathetic stakeholder community 
(cf. Batory and Lindstrom 2011), generally in tune with its own agenda and 
structurally supportive of further ‘European’ action in the area.  In this way, the 
Commission has ‘dominated the discourse’ (Keeling 2006) – forcing other actors, at a 
minimum, to situate themselves in relation to a ‘neo-liberal modernisation’ agenda. 
This ‘neo-liberal’ referent then, in turn, also comes to be seen as characterising 
European-level HE discussions more generally, despite the open-textured character of 
the Bologna Process itself. 
 Somewhat different strategies of discursive closure appear at the national 
level.  Here, in keeping with the initial ‘reformist’ impetus behind Bologna, a number 
of West European governments have sought to use the process as a means to 
legitimate comparatively wide ranging reforms of national HE systems.  Thus, for 
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example, in Germany a ‘Bologna’ discourse of European convergence was deployed 
as something of a bulwark to support comparatively broad reforms of the university 
system – provoking commensurately widespread protests often invoking the defence 
of a traditional, Humboldtian model of higher education (Braband and Thumfart 
forthcoming).  Elsewhere, a pattern appears to have emerged in a number of post-
Communist Central and East European countries whereby Bologna has effectively 
been treated as part of the EU acquis – consequently enjoying a status akin to ‘hard 
law’, though at the risk of falling victim to a more general ‘dead letter’ pattern of non-
enforcement identified in the region (Dakowska forthcoming; Deca forthcoming). 
While the broader questions thus raised concerning the implementation or 
application of Bologna on the ground are beyond the present study, the discursive 
pattern nonetheless bears underlining.  Generally, a strong tendency has emerged in 
which ‘Bologna’ is equated with predominately ‘neo-liberal’ or ‘New Public 
Management’ inspired programmes of university reform.  A selective interpretation of 
European norms is used in a bid to close or limit debate, implying the existence of 
external obligations to which the government is itself obliged to conform.  
Oppositions, correspondingly, have tended to adopt an ‘anti-Bologna’ posture – i.e. 
have assumed the form of a systemic opposition to the European project itself, seen 
(following the government’s rhetoric) as the ultimate source of the unwanted changes.  
Strikingly – and reflecting the deeper dearth of a meaningful communicative 
discourse – such oppositions have not, for the most part, significantly questioned 
governments’ often questionable invocations of Bologna norms, nor sought more 
widely to develop competing agendas in line with alternative readings of European 
and international developments.  Bologna, at the national level, thus appears primarily 
as an instrument used to close rather than to open discussions over HE policy. 
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Conclusion 
 Although the distinctive characteristics of the Bologna Process as a pan-
European entity outside of the EU must be borne in mind, the process nonetheless 
bears a broad resemblance to the OMC as developed within the EU, displaying many 
of the same relative potentialities and shortcomings.  As detailed above, perhaps the 
single most important achievement of Bologna has been the creation of a ‘common 
language’ – a shared, pan-European framework for the understanding of higher 
education that has both facilitated discussion and provided templates for reform. 
Bologna has created a meaningful discursive space, and further played a significant, if 
variable role in processes of broadly convergent HE reform.  Nevertheless, as also 
detailed above, the process exhibits many of the limitations more widely associated 
with soft law instruments of governance.  While reporting procedures have 
undoubtedly improved over the years, the overall experience of peer review and 
monitoring remains uneven at best, with no strong sense of obligation or constraint 
appearing to exist on a systemic level.  Equally, insofar as the new modes of 
governance are equated with a ‘democratising’ intent, Bologna displays notable – and 
largely symptomatic – shortcomings.  Although allowing for significant stakeholder 
input, the overall contours of the process nonetheless appear relatively closed – and, 
even more, appear to facilitate strategies of closure as regards HE policy debates in 
other arenas. 
 The response to these shortcomings in the HE policy sector has been much the 
same as that seen more generally in response to critical assessments of the functioning 
of the OMC.  The tendency has been to see these shortcomings as the inevitable 
product of the structural failings of the new modes of governance themselves – the 
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‘cure worse than any old governance disease’ (Idema and Keleman 2006: 120). This 
is then further taken to point to the need to return to traditional instruments of legal 
obligation and parliamentary control as the only means to establish effective and 
legitimate governance.  As regards Bologna, this case has been strongly made by 
Sacha Garben (2011; 2010) in her critical interpretation of the process from a 
‘European law perspective’.  For Garben, Bologna, resembling ‘a deal done in a 
smoke-filled room’, suffers from problems of ‘democracy, transparency and 
efficiency’ (Garben 2010: 186).  These problems, she further argues, may effectively 
be addressed by bringing the process within the normal remit of EU law, which would 
have the effect of providing for both parliamentary accountability (through the EP) 
and judicial recourse for non-compliance (through the CJEU).  Moreover, such a 
recourse to EU structures and procedures would also, in her view, relieve the tension 
created by the existence of such an extra-mural process relative to the ‘loyal 
cooperation’ demanded of member states under Article 10 TEU. 
 While much of Garben’s diagnosis parallels the analysis developed above, it is 
difficult to view her proposed remedy as anything other than a politically facile legal 
formalism.  Quite apart from the pan-European dimension now assumed by the 
process, it is clear that its underlying intergovernmental logic derives from the deep 
national political sensitivities that surround the policy area.  It was only the loose 
intergovernmentalism of Bologna which, indeed, allowed for the development of a 
substantial European-level HE policy space – member states having, beforehand, 
repeatedly rebuffed Commission forays seeking to establish a presence in the area 
(Corbett 2005).  Similarly, the claim, in the area of HE as more generally, that 
recourse to EU procedures necessarily provides a more effective avenue for 
addressing issues of democracy and accountability falls rather flat.  This, at a 
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minimum, requires careful reflection against a background in which widely mooted 
concerns about the democratic deficit show little sign of abating.  
 Rather than the need for a traditional ‘legalisation’ or ‘parliamentarisation’, 
the principal lesson of the Bologna process, as a practice of governance, appears to be 
that of the need for a better problematisation of the manner in which the new modes 
of governance create and reshape policy arenas. To a large extent, we already have 
the tools to undertake such analysis.  It should not be forgotten that Lowi’s (2009) 
seminal statement of a ‘policy arenas’ framework was embedded in an analysis of 
American federalism, and more specifically of the evolving role of the US federal 
government over time.  Equally, much of the analysis undertaken above could readily 
be placed in a framework such as that of Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) account of 
the emergence of ‘policy monopolies’, seen through the interplay of institutional 
venues and policy images.  Yet, the distinctiveness of contemporary European 
experience should also not be lost. In effect, that which we see in the Bologna 
Process, and more widely with the OMC, is the creation of ‘normative arenas’, 
divorced from direct regulatory or (re-) distributive decisions.  This creates novel 
patterns of strategic possibilities and limitations that merit more sustained attention 
than they have thus far received.     The complex relationships between differential 
participation in different policy arenas and the discursive construction of prevailing 
policy paradigms will need to be empirically teased out and conceptually modeled.   
Indeed, as suggested by the present study, it is in understanding the detail of such 
relationships, beyond bald statements of opposition between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
governance, that one can best hope to understand the wider challenges of 
contemporary democratic governance as an integrated whole.  
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